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 Elham Manea
 The Arab Popular Uprisings from a Gender Perspective
 As uprisings have engulfed their region, Arab women have often lost out. They have
 repeatedly been marginalized or have directly experienced a backlash during the transi
 tional period and most of the developments in the region. Indeed, women have generally
 been excluded from the decision-making process; in the few places where they were
 adequately represented, they have watched members of Islamist parties set the tone, often
 attacking the gender equality envisioned by the UN's conventions on human rights.
 Women have also been the targets of systematic violence from both the Arab states and
 from fundamentalists, and of reactionary religious propaganda and measures that threat
 en to eliminate the gains they have made over recent decades.
 However, as this paper will argue, this kind of backlash is hardly new. In fact, as many
 other scholars have shown, throughout history this pattern has been a feature of political
 upheavals: women have often defied social norms by participating in public events, only
 to be pushed back into their former traditional roles by conservative backlash. Never
 theless, such backlash often does not hinder the development of a new gender conscious
 ness, one that seeks to break away from traditional norms and roles. This also holds true
 for the developments that are taking place in the Arab Middle East & North Africa region
 (ΜΕΝΑ).
 In order to clarify this argument, the paper will first discuss the pattern of women's
 political participation that was then followed by their exclusion in the region, offering
 concrete examples. It will then highlight the argument that this backlash may not be
 surprising after all. Next, it will offer specific examples of activist actions that show that,
 despite the conservative backlash, the flux now taking place in the region is indeed un
 settling gender perceptions and roles. Whether these changes are sustainable remains a
 matter of speculation.
 1. Participation Followed by Exclusion
 In the introduction to her edited volume The Unfinished Revolution, Minkey Worden
 argues that while the Arab Spring has raised high hopes, it is already clear that
 these »political revolutions alone will not be enough to secure rights for women, and
 might even lead to the weakening of key rights protections«.1 High hopes were raised
 because women participated visibly in the uprisings and revolts that swept several coun
 1 Μ inky Worden, The Unfinished Revolution: Voices from the Global Fight for Women's Rights,
 New York 2012, p. 1.
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 tries in the Arab ΜΕΝΑ region. But, what is equally visible is that these revolutions
 cannot secure rights for women, given the pattern of repeated exclusion that has occurred
 since the original uprisings.
 1. 1 Forms of Participation
 Women were an integral and active part of the political developments in the region. Just
 like their male counterparts, they demanded change in the political system and with it
 sought a future with real prospects and economic opportunities. Lack of economic op
 portunities, the political stagnation caused by patronage systems, corruption, and the
 lack of good governance all were factors that contributed to their demand for change.
 Both women and men chanted slogans that included the words freedom, dignity, social
 justice, and democracy as they participated in the revolts in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya,
 Yemen, Bahrain and Syria (during its peaceful phase). Just like their male partners, wom
 en utilized modern media and technology as tools in their activism. Like Asma Mahfouz
 in Egypt, they used the Internet to mobilize for protests; like Arwa Othman in Yemen,
 they documented the youth uprising through photos; and like Lina Ben Mhenni in
 Tunisia, they reported on the revolution at a time when media coverage was limited.
 At this stage, however, women's active participation was characterized with two fea
 tures. First, the type of women's participation during this phase was often shaped by the
 country's local context. The different contexts of Tunisia and Yemen illustrate this point.
 In Tunisia, a country with a secular tradition, progressive family law, and a high lit
 eracy rate, women were visible from the very start of the Jasmine revolution in December
 2010. They also participated actively in planning it and in demonstrating. Amel Grami,
 a Tunisian professor on Gender and Islamic Studies and a leading activist for women's
 rights, explained:2
 »Women mobilized for protests via Facebook; were integral participants in action
 planning meetings at the universities, labour unions, and political parties; coordinated
 between organizations; documented the revolution via pictures and videos; and were
 part of the people's committees that protected Tunisian neighbourhoods [when law
 and order collapsed]; they hid the wounded from the pursuit of police and gave food
 to the army«.
 By contrast, in Yemen, women's participation has been shaped by the conservative nature
 of society. Yemen is considered the least developed country in the Arab ΜΕΝΑ region,
 and in the Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI) it continues to occupy the last place in the
 region as well as in the overall global ranking of 135 countries.3 Despite the vibrant civil
 society, and activism, in Yemen, women participating in the public sphere have always
 faced a cultural stigma. In fact, Nadia Al-Sakaf, the female editor-in-chief of the English
 2 Amel Grami, email interview, October 6, 2012.
 3 Ricardo Hausmann / Laura D. Tyson / Saadia Zahidi, »The Global Gender Gap Report 2012«,
 Geneva 2012, p. 26.
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 language newspaper Yemen Times and a member of the Board of Presidency of the Na
 tional Dialogue Conference, recounted that »immediately before the start of Yemen's
 chapter of the Arab Spring, it was unheard of for women—especially those coming from
 conservative backgrounds—to be photographed by strangers, let alone take to the streets
 in protest«.4
 It took a while before women's participation became possible and even fashionable.
 One female protestor whom this author met in Sana'a in February of 2011 explained
 that »we started with two women« at the sit-in in Taghir Square, »and now we are thou
 sands«.5 The participation of well-known activists, including Tawakul Karman, Arwa
 Othman, Wameth Shakir, and Shatha Al-Harazi, was instrumental in challenging the
 rigidly conservative norms regarding women participating in public protests.
 Second, when women did participate during the early phase of the revolts, they did so
 without any gender-specific agenda. Each country's context shaped the type of dissatis
 faction that both male and female protestors were expressing during this early stage. For
 example, in Egypt and Tunisia, two countries with a history of state formation, bureau
 cratic development, and a solid national identity, the protestors demanded social justice
 and an end to the brutal police state regime. In Bahrain, on the other hand, the protestors
 were fed up with the Sunni Bin Khalifa dynasty because it continued to exclude the Shiite
 majority, both politically and economically. In Libya and Yemen, women and men were
 initially united in their desire to see their despots toppled, though they were divided along
 regional, tribal, and sectarian lines in course of time. Regardless of the context, at this
 stage female protestors were not concerned with gender-specific demands. Those de
 mands emerged later on, as a pattern of exclusion repeated itself.
 1. 2 Forms of Exclusion
 Women's participation in the Arab Spring was followed by a backlash that sought to
 intimidate them and then exclude and shun them from the public sphere. This review will
 restrict the discussion to the countries that witnessed a change of leadership at the top of
 their political structures. The backlash took different forms during three phases.
 1.2.1. Phase One
 During this phase, specifically during the uprising, acts of sexual violence targeted wom
 en. This took several forms. Libya witnessed the worst forms of sexual violence during
 its brief civil war. Several human rights organizations have asserted that rape was used as
 a weapon of war to humiliate and break the morale of opposition fighters. There were
 also reports of Viagra being distributed among troops loyal to the former dictator
 4 Nadia Al-Sakkaf, »Yemen's Women and the Quest for Change: Political Participation after the
 Arab Revolution« in: Perspective Report, Berlin October 2012, p. 1.
 5 Author's visit, Sana'a, February 22,2011.
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 Qaddafi.6 The problem was aggravated by the stigma connected with rape. The male
 relatives of women who had been raped took various actions. Some committed suicide;
 others killed the women who had been raped; still others, acting in fear, killed women
 family members to prevent them being raped when Qaddafi's troops advanced to their
 areas.7
 Though on a different scale, sexual violence was also used in Tunisia and Egypt, where
 members of the security apparatus systematically harassed, threatened, and targeted
 women, using sexual violence to intimidate them, according both to Federation interna
 tionale des ligues des droits de l'Homme and to Iqbal Gharbi, a Tunisian Professor who
 followed these events closely.8
 Yemen did not witness this type of sexual violence, but the cultural norms that con
 demn the mixing of sexes caused problems for women who wanted to participate. Shatha
 Al-Harazi, a young woman activist who took part in the protests and is a member of the
 National Dialogue Conference, described the situation: »Women participating in the
 protests were harassed by their own families, who tried to prevent them from leaving
 home. They feared for their safety or were reacting to rumours spread by supporters of
 [former Yemeni president] Saleh about the inappropriate mixing< between young men
 and women in the sit-in squares«.9 Saleh openly exploited the social norms in a speech
 on April 15,2011. He said, »Islam forbids men and women mixing in public places«, and
 called on women to »return home«.10 His comments led Islamists to crack down on the
 sit-in camps and to impose strict segregation between the sexes.
 1.2.2 Phase Two
 This phase occurred after the fall of the incumbent presidents and during the transitional
 period that led to elections. At this stage, women were often excluded from the decision
 making process; here Tunisia was the exception. This marginalization reflected a wider
 conservative social context. Sexual violence and harassment were also part of the pat
 tern.
 In Libya, women were often token representatives; this followed a pattern that was
 also common during the Ghadafi regime: women held »soft« positions related to women
 and social affairs. Among the 14 members of the National Transitional Council (NTC),
 established on February 27, 2011, one woman was in charge of legal affairs and women.
 Ν. Ν., »Evidence emerging of use of rape as tool of war in Libya - ICC prosecutor« in: UN
 News Centre, June 8, 2011, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp ?NewsID=38664&Cr=li
 bya&Crl (accessed Oct. 30, 2012).
 Ν. N., »Women and the Arab Spring: Taking their place?« in: FIDH Federation internationale
 des ligues des droits de l'Homme, March 2012, http://www.fidh.org/Women-and-the-Arab-S
 pring-The (accessed Oct. 31, 2012), pp. 27-28.
 Ν. N., »Women and the Arab Spring: Taking their place?«, op. cit. (FN 7), p. 18; Iqbal Gharbi,
 email interview, October 14, 2012.
 Shatha Al-Harazi, email interview, October 8, 2012.
 President Ali Abdullah Saleh, »Speech« in: Yemen Satellite Channel, April 15,2011, YouTube,
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qZNMYn5lOY8 (accessed Sept. 9,2013).
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 In the first cabinet that the NTC announced in November of 2011, out of 28 members
 two women held portfolios: for health and social affairs. The number of women repre
 sentatives remained unchanged in the 33-member cabinet created after the election. This
 time they again held two portfolios: those for social affairs and tourism.11
 While nominal representation is common within the Arab ΜΕΝΑ context, in Libya
 it occurred against the backdrop of deep-rooted patriarchal traditions, a tribal culture,
 and conservative social norms. This was combined with Islamist conservatism, which has
 been a common feature of most of the new political elites. These factors together played
 a role in producing laws that discriminate against women in the-post Qaddafi era. In
 2013, for example, Libya's Supreme Court effectively lifted some of the existing restric
 tions on polygamy. Polygamy had been legal in Libya under Qaddafi, but the law re
 quired a man to obtain the consent of any current wife or wives before marrying a second
 or third one. However, on February 5,2013, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme
 Court ruled that this law contradicted Libya's Constitutional Declaration because it »ex
 plicitly states that Islamic law is the principal source of legislation«. It added that the
 marriage law »restricted polygamy with a set of conditions that make polygamy often
 impossible, thereby implicitly prohibiting it. As such, it is in violation of the constitu
 tion«.12 A second example is the effective prohibition against Libyan women marrying
 foreigners. In fact, Human Rights Watch reported that in April of 2013, the Ministry of
 Social Affairs stopped issuing marriage licenses for Libyan women marrying foreigners
 after Libya's grand mufti called on the government to ban the practice.13
 Egypt offers the worst example of institutional exclusion among the countries that
 experienced the Arab Spring. Douaa Hussein, an Egyptian expert on gender issues, ex
 plained this weak representation by pointing to the conservative nature of members of
 the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and their alliance with the Muslim
 Brotherhood after the fall of Mubarak. The alliance affected the composition of all the
 committees created during this period.14 For instance, the Constitutional Review Com
 mittee did not have a single woman among its members. In fact, most of its members
 were also members of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) or figures known to be sympathetic
 to MB ideology. Within this context, the SCAF decided to abolish the quota of 10 percent
 women in parliament that was introduced during the Mubarak era. The result was im
 mediate: after the parliamentary elections at the end of 2011, women had only 2 percent
 of seats in the new parliament.15
 Ν. Ν., »A Revolution for All« in: Human Rights Watch, May 27, 2013, p. 14-15, http://ww
 w.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/libya0513_brochure_L0WR£S_0.pdf (accessed Sept. 9,
 2013); Ν. N., »Women and the Arab Spring: Taking their place?«, op. cit. (FN 7), pp. 27-29.
 Quoted in N. N. »A Revolution for All«, op. cit. (FN 11), p. 30.
 Ν. N. »A Revolution for All«, op. cit. (FN 11), p. 31.
 Douaa Hussein, email interview, October 12, 2012.
 Ν. N., »Women and the Arab Spring: Taking their place?«, op. cit. (FN 7), pp. 19/20;
 Ν. N., »Statement by the National Front of Egyptian Women on the Composition of the
 Constituent Assembly« in: Al Ahali Newspaper (in Arabic), September 11, 2012, http://www
 .masress.com/alahaly/16197 (accessed Nov. 1, 2012); Mervat Hatem, »Gender and revolution
 in Egypt« in: Middle East Report, N. 261 (Winter 2011).
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 In contrast, Tunisia stands as the exception in women's representation. Adequate rep
 resentation, however, hardly meant actual influence in seeking gender justice; in fact, just
 the opposite occurred. The reform of the election law adopted by the high commission
 on April 11,2011, required parity on electoral lists. This was the first reform of this kind
 in the region and beyond. During the October 2011 elections, however, the vast majority
 of parties put men at the top of the lists; as a result, the assembly responsible for drawing
 up the new constitution did not have an equal representation of men and women. Women
 won 59 of the 217 seats (27 %). Of these women, 39 belonged to the Islamist Ennahda
 party, which won 89 of the overall seats, around 41 %.16 The conservative Islamist ide
 ology held by the Ennahda women parliamentarians was strongly felt as this paper will
 illustrate later.
 In Yemen, women's representation was mixed. It was shaped by the fragile political
 context and the international fear that the state would collapse. The possible regional and
 international repercussions of the Yemeni crisis led international actors - i. e., the Gulf
 Cooperation Council and the United States - to step in to reduce the risk of a full-scale
 state collapse. Given their concerns about counter-terrorism, these countries designed a
 policy they hoped would stabilize and legitimize an ally willing to cooperate with their
 security priorities.17 This policy was again evident in the way the Gulf Initiative of May
 2011 was formulated. It sought to stabilize the situation by keeping the political order
 intact and negotiated a compromise with the very military and tribal elites that brought
 the country to collapse. Not surprisingly, women, considered politically insignificant,
 were not involved at all during the negotiation that led to the declaration of the Gulf
 Initiative, which, however, did provide a roadmap out of the crisis.
 Still, once the agreement was reached, the involvement of the United Nations and
 international actors, such as the EU, Britain (involved independently outside the frame
 work of EU) and the United States, guaranteed that women could participate in the
 bodies established to oversee the transitional period. Pressure from Yemeni women's
 activists was instrumental in achieving this goal. Amal Albasha, Director of the Sisters
 Arab Forum for Eluman Rights and later the official spokeswoman of the National Di
 alogue's Technical Committee, recounted that 35 women's activists organized to meet
 with Jamal Benomar, United Nations Special Adviser on Yemen. Initially, his assistant
 declined a meeting request. Amal Albasha, who was conducting the communication,
 threatened to raise a complaint to the United Nations about their exclusion from the
 process, demanding that the UN respects its women's rights commitments. Benomar met
 with them and promised their inclusion.18 Hence, women made up 27 percent of the
 Ν. Ν., »Women and the Arab Spring: Taking their place?«, op. cit. (FN 7), p. 28; Ν. N., »Final
 Report on the Tunisian National Constituent Assembly elections« in: National Democratic
 Institute, October 23,2011, p. 17, http://www.ndi.org/files/tunisia-final-election-report-021
 712_v2.pdf (accessed Sept. 10, 2013).
 Ginny Hill / Peter Salisbury / Leonie Northedge / Jane Kinninmont, »Yemen: Corruption,
 Capital flight and Global Drivers of Conflict« in: A Chatham House Report, London, Septem
 ber 2013, p. 3.
 Amal Albasha, interview by author, Sana'a, November 11, 2013.
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 Technical Committee, which is tasked with preparing a national dialogue conference,
 and they are 30 percent of the members of the national dialogue conference.
 Before concluding, it should be mentioned that during this second phase, both the state
 and Islamist groups perpetrated acts of systematic violence and intimidation that targeted
 women, and they faced no legal or social consequences. Two examples will illuminate
 this point.
 In Egypt, on March 8, 2011, women gathered in Tahrir Square to mark International
 Women's Day. They were attacked and harassed by a male group of counter-protestors.
 A day later, the harassment became more systematic when the army stormed the square
 and arrested the protestors; 18 women were detained, and the army forced seven of them
 to undergo »virginity tests«. In March 2012, a military court acquitted the only military
 officer on trial for this sexual assault.19 The security forces, and various thugs, repeatedly
 engaged in systematic sexual violence during the military transitional period and the short
 term of former President Morsi. It did not really make a difference whether the incum
 bent was a military council or a member of an Islamist party. The methods of intimidation
 remained the same.
 In Tunisia, Islamist Salafi groups — emboldened by the quick collapse of law and order
 and then the rise of Islamist parties in the country—started to target women teachers and
 students in universities and tried to impose religious dress on unveiled students and
 teachers, sometimes using violence and intimidation to achieve their purpose. A famous
 case of a well-known woman professor at Zeituna University illustrates how the failure
 to address such intimidation left women vulnerable. Using an alias, she explained:
 »To my shock after the revolution, I came to campus to give my class lectures and was
 confronted by students and professors who demanded that I veil myself on campus.
 I refused to submit to their request. As a result, they banned me from teaching unless
 I wore the veil. It was a battle every day as I walked on the campus. Unfortunately,
 due to the ridicule and discrimination I have suffered on this issue, I have now begun
 to wear the veil as I teach my classes so I can keep my job and continue to educate my
 students«.20
 1.2.3 Phase Three
 This phase saw the Islamist parties come to political power in Tunisia and Egypt; with
 it came a backlash of another sort, a dogmatic one that insists on the inherent inequality
 between woman and man. Despite the differences between the Islamist political parties
 that came to power in Tunisia and Egypt, what they share is a conservative religious
 perspective towards women. Islamist movements, in their two influential versions, the
 Muslim Brotherhood and Salafism, have a principled position towards women. They
 19 Ν. Ν., »Women and the Arab Spring: Taking their place?«, op. cit. (FN 7), p. 17;N. N., »World
 Report 2013« in: Human Rights Watch, New York 2013, p. 531.
 20 Quoted in Ν. N., »Women and the Arab Spring«, op. cit. (FN 7), Appendix D, Committee on
 Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Washington, DC, November 2, 2011, Kindle issue.
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 differ in the limits they want to see imposed on women's role in society, but they share
 the conviction that women should be at home. They both believe in a biological distinc
 tion between man and woman, which, in their view, should be reflected in differences in
 rights.21
 Hassan Al Banna, the founder of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, articulated this
 view: »The distinction between man and woman in rights comes from their natural dif
 ferences, which are unavoidable (inevitable), and in accordance with the difference in the
 task each is conducting, and for the protection of the rights given to each... «.22 According
 to this view, women are equal to men in dignity but not in rights, and the protection of
 women requires men's guardianship. Moreover, the Salafi movement insists that because
 the woman's role is to be at home, she should not be allowed to work or to be politically
 active. On the other hand, while the Muslim Brothers subscribe to the same demand that
 women tend to their »natural« role as mothers, they accept their economic and political
 participation within certain limits. Both insist, however, that men's authority over wom
 en, in both family and society, remains unchallenged.23
 These ideological features are reflected in the demands and measures advocated by
 Islamist parliamentarians and policy makers in Tunisia and Egypt. In Tunisia, where the
 majority of women in the Constituent Assembly were members of the Islamist Ennahda
 party, their world view had an effect on the promulgation of the constitution and clashed
 with organizations advocating for women's rights and human rights. Amel Grami ex
 plained:24
 »Given that the majority of women members were from the Ennahda party and have
 no experience either in human rights activism or with the women's struggle [...] most
 of them followed the demands and orders of the party: Ennahda women supported
 substituting »complementary roles< for »equality between man and woman<; they op
 posed naming international human rights conventions as references for the constitu
 tion, and insisted on criminalizing offenses against the >sanctities< [...]. [Over time it
 became clear] that their motivation was revenge for the [secular] eras of Bourqiba and
 Bin Ali«.
 The third draft of the Tunisian constitution, published in April 2013, did not refer to
 international human rights conventions; instead, in Article 5, it considered the state to
 be the patron of religion and the protector of sanctities. Accordingly, religion, Koran,
 and Islamic figures are all issues the state should protect. It also omitted the word »equal«
 in the formulation of Article 11 on women and men: »women and men shall be partners
 in the construction of the society and the state«. However, the outcry that followed the
 For concrete examples on the world views of the two Islamist groups towards women in
 Yemen, Syria and Kuwait, see Elham Manea, The Arab State and Women's Rights: the Trap of
 Authoritarian Governance, London 2011.
 Hasan Al Banna, »The Muslim Woman Tract«, in Arabic, n. d.
 Elham Manea, Ich will nicht mehr schweigen: der Islam, der Westen und die Menschenrechte,
 Freiburg 2009, pp. 162-164.
 Amal Grami, email interview, October 6, 2012.
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 publication of Article 28 in the first draft of the constitution made Ennahda compromise
 on mentioning the »complementary roles« of men and women in the constitution.
 In Egypt, Islamist parliamentarians belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi
 parties (which together secured 75 % of the seats) tried unsuccessfully to reverse some
 protections for women. They tried to lower the age of marriage, set by law at 18, to
 the »age of puberty«; to abolish a law that bans female genital mutilation; and to reinstate
 old marriage and divorce laws that had been gradually scrapped during the previous
 decade.25 They did succeed, however, in shaping the constitution of 2012 to correspond
 to their world view.26 As in Tunisia, the new constitution failed to state that international
 law took precedence over national law. Again, this raised concerns about Egypt's com
 mitment to the human rights treaties to which it is a state party. In addition, the consti
 tution failed to list clear grounds that prohibit discrimination; these include sex, religion,
 and origin. Instead, it simply stated in Article 33 that citizens »are equal in public rights
 and duties and they shall not be discriminated against«, failing to mirror the non-ex
 haustive formulation contained in the international covenants.27
 Finally, the failure to explicitly prohibit discrimination on the grounds of gender was
 compounded by the effects of Article 219, which defines the principles of Shari'a law.
 According to Article 2, Shari'a is defined as the »fundamental rules of jurispru
 dence«.28 The formulation of article 219, which defines Shari'a in terms of rules and not
 of principles, was bound to impact the rights of women, especially as these rules often
 discriminate against women in many areas, including marriage, divorce, and family life.
 While articles in a constitution may be theoretical by their very nature, the ruling
 Freedom and Justice Party and its Muslim Brotherhood movement were hardly theo
 retical in their position towards women's rights when its representatives attended the
 57th session of the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women in New York
 between 4 and 15 March 2013. The session succeeded in producing a non-binding UN
 document entitled »On the elimination and prevention of all forms of violence against
 women and girls«. On March 13, the Muslim Brothers sharply criticised the document
 in a statement, saying it was »deceitful« and that it clashed with Islamic principles and
 undermined family values. Specifically, they complained about: substituting male
 guardianship with partnership within the family; full equality in marriage law, prohibi
 Iman Bibars, »The Middle East: Fighting for Women's Rights« in: Reuters, June 21, 2013,
 http://www.trust.org/item/20130621101103-68ft5/ (accessed Sept. 11, 2013);
 Safaa Abdoun, »Factbox: Women's Rights in Egypt«, Reuters, November 9, 2012, http://ww
 w.trust.org/item/?map=factbox-womens-rights-in-egypt (accessed Sept. 11, 2013).
 Out of the 100 members in the Constituent Assembly, which was assigned the task of drafting
 a new constitution, seven were women; five of them were members of Islamist parties and have
 expressed views at odds with gender justice and equality; see Ν. N., »Women and the Arab
 Spring: Taking their place?«, op. cit. (FN 7), 19-20; Ν. N., »Statement by the National Front
 of Egyptian Women on the Composition of the Constituent Assembly«, op. cit. (FN 15).
 Ν. N., »Egypt's New Constitution limits Fundamental Freedoms and ignores the Rights of
 Women« in: Amnesty International, Press Release, November 30, 2012, http://www.amnest
 y.org/en/for-media/press-releases/egypt-s-new-constitution-limits-fundamental-freedoms-a
 nd-ignores-rights-wom (accessed Sept. 11, 2013).
 Ibid.
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 tion of polygamy; acceptance of a Muslim woman's marriage to a non-Muslim; equality
 between the sexes in inheritance; penalizing rape within marriage, and women's sexual
 freedom and reproductive rights.29
 2. Attitudes, Norms, and Mobilization in Flux
 Thus far, this paper has shown how the optimism about women's participation, which
 was growing during the early phase of the Arab Spring, was replaced with gloomy ap
 prehension and serious worries, especially as the backlash sought to systematically in
 timidate and exclude women. Yet this exclusion is neither surprising nor new. In fact, it
 is part of a historical pattern long observed within the Arab region. Women have often
 participated in revolutions and resistance movements and have defied traditional norms
 and structures. Yet when these periods of extraordinary events end, their gains, in terms
 of both space and independence, fade quickly. Examples abound; they include the 1919
 Revolution in Egypt, the Syrian Independence Movement of the 1930s and 1940s, the
 Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962), the Palestinian Intifada (1987-1991), and
 the short Kuwaiti struggle for independence against the Iraqi occupation (1990—1991).30
 Globally, on the other hand, scholars in gender studies have observed mixed outcomes
 among the effects and after-effects of women mobilizing into new roles during periods
 of war, revolution, and political upheaval. In fact, Julia and Ridha point out that tempo
 rary reversal of gender roles during wars have led to role transformations in some coun
 tries. For example, the status of women in France and Britain progressed more during
 the years of World War I than during several decades of peace. The same can be said
 about women during the Civil War in the United States, which created a »revolution of
 woman herself« and provided a »springboard from which women leaped beyond the
 circumscribed women's sphere into arenas heretofore reserved to men«. This experience
 was enhanced during World War I; women »described their wartime activities as per
 sonally liberating«.31 However, Julia and Ridha make another point. In some cases, war
 can open up new areas to women, as they take on the work and decision-making re
 sponsibilities of the now-absent men, and these changes later become accepted and in
 tegrated into the societies. This has happened recently in Eritrea and the Tigray region.
 Ν. Ν. »Statement of the Muslim Brothers on the Document of the UN Women's Centre 13
 March 2013« in: Ikhwanonline (in Arabic), March 13, 2013, http://www.ikhwanonline.com/
 Article.aspx?ArtID=141984&SecID=212 (accessed Sept. 11, 2013).
 Mervat Hatem, »Gender and revolution in Egypt« in: Middle East Report, N. 261 (Winter
 2011); Elham Manea, The Arab State and Women's Rights, op. cit; Mervat F Hatem, »The
 Pitfalls of the Nationalist Discourses on Citizenship in Egypt« in: Suad Joseph (ed.), Gender
 and Citizenship in the Middle East, Syracuse 2000; Nikki R. Keddie, Women in the Middle
 East: Past and Present, Princeton 2006; Miriam Cooke / Angela Woollacott (eds.), Gendering
 War Talk, Princeton 1993.
 Maria Julia / Hadi Ridha, »Women and War: the Role Kuwaiti Women Played during the Iraqi
 Occupation« in: Journal of International Development, Volume 13, Nr. 5 0uly 2001), pp. 585,
 595.
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 More often, however, women's positions in relation to men remain unchanged, or little
 changed, once the men return home.32
 Not all of the upheavals of the Arab Spring caused wars. Libya had a short civil war,
 Syria is now in civil war, and Yemen saw sporadic spats of armed conflicts in various
 areas. In Egypt and Tunisia, the uprisings did not lead to the absence of men that Julia
 and Ridha mention; instead, it led to situations where women and men, working together,
 shaped the events unfolding in their home countries through their participation, mobi
 lization, and actions. The question that one should ask here is this: Have the situations
 of wars and uprisings, where women came to the fore and sometimes, as in Yemen and
 Libya, assumed new roles, led to a sustainable change in women's lives and their roles in
 society?
 Clearly, it is too early to give a definite answer to this question. What is also clear,
 however, is that many of these countries are in a state of flux, like melting wax, and despite
 the backlash of Islamist fundamentalism and heavy-handed police state tactics in some
 of these states, activists fighting for gender justice have not been pushed to silence. In
 fact the opposite has occurred. Hence, although the first phase of women's mobilization
 during the early stages of the Arab Spring lacked a gender agenda, once they experienced
 the backlash, women started to coordinate their mobilization in a better way, and they
 articulated their demands for women's rights and gender equality. Most important, sev
 eral actions that challenged the established social norms in matters concerning social
 behaviour, sexuality, and homosexuality indicate that a new gender consciousness is
 slowly emerging. In the following section, examples of two types of gender-specific ac
 tions will be highlighted. Those in the first type aim to integrate women's rights into
 laws. Those in the second type defy traditional norms regarding sexuality in general.
 First, some mobilization actions aim to integrate women's rights and equality into
 constitutions and laws and seek better political representation at the institutional level.
 These actions have yet to produce any actual impact or real change, and the fractured
 political elites at the top have often held them hostage to the politics of survival.
 As mentioned earlier, when women participated in the early stages of the Arab Spring,
 they did not have a gender-specific agenda. This changed after the incumbent presidents
 stepped down and women were systematically excluded from the transitional bodies and
 institutions that were shaping the emerging political order. However, instead of being
 pushed to silence, as happened in earlier situations in the Arab ΜΕΝΑ region, this time
 women have frequently mobilized and coordinated their efforts to systematically counter
 these attempts to exclude them.
 In Egypt, the »blue bra incident« of December 17,2011, was a rallying point for women
 and men alike. The incident was the savage beating of a female protestor by Egyptian
 military forces. Clips and videos revealed a limp woman being dragged by her arms along
 the street, with her abaya ripped open, exposing her naked torso and blue bra. Security
 32 Ibid.
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 forces surround her, many wielding batons; guards hit her and one stomps on her.33 In
 response, on December 20, thousands of women and men marched in Cairo's Tahrir
 Square in what was described as the largest demonstration of women in Egypt in decades.
 According to Douaa Hussein, an Egyptian gender expert, this incident was a defining
 point for the women's movement in Egypt. She explained:34
 »Before the incident the performance of women's organizations and human rights
 activists was very weak and any reactions were tentative and ineffective. The reactions
 to the composition of the constitutional committee, which did not even have one
 woman, were merely comments and denunciations. All the later ministerial reshuffles
 and the governors' appointments all passed with mere condemnation, out of propor
 tion to the policies of marginalization [...].«
 However, in the second phase, after the incident, she saw a change:
 »[...] their performance and discourse [...] became more unified [·.·]. [It started] with
 the 20 December march in response to the >blue bra incident [...] and the discourse
 became stronger and more proactive. Women's organizations participated and made
 suggestions about the law on non-governmental organizations, and 7 organisations
 developed complete drafts of the constitution; and they established a coalition of
 women's organizations [...].«
 Coordinated mobilization was also observed after the uprising against President Morsi
 on June 30,2013. For example, on September 8, the Committee of Women for the Con
 stitution sent an open letter to the Committee of the Constitution, which was created to
 modify the 2012 Constitution. The women's committee had several demands for the new
 constitution. It should
 »declare Egypt's respect for international conventions to which it is a party; specify a
 quota for women in all elected councils with a percentage no less than 35 %; declare
 clearly equality, equal opportunities and non-discrimination between the sexes; crim
 inalize all forms of discrimination; integrate gender mainstreaming within the society;
 guarantee economic, social, and cultural rights and human development while obliging
 the State to allocate the necessary resources (health care, education and scientific re
 search, housing, employment, pensions and social insurance, etc.) in accordance with
 specific standards and targets«.35
 Similar demands were also articulated by the Coalition of Women's Organizations, this
 time to the Committee of Fifty, which had been assigned the task of drafting the modified
 Isobel Coleman, >»Blue bra girl< rallies Egypt's women vs. oppression« in: CNN online, De
 cember 22, 2011, http://edition.cnn.com/2011/12/22/opinion/coleman-women-egypt-protes
 t/index.html (accessed Oct. 8, 2013).
 Douaa Hussein, email interview, October 12, 2012.
 Ν. N, »An Open Letter to the Committee on the Constitution«, Committee of "Women and
 Constitution (in Arabic), September 8, 2013.
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 constitution.36 However, the fact that women could coordinate their mobilization and
 articulate their gender-related demands does not necessarily mean they had any real in
 fluence. They have so far had little influence in the Egyptian context. Concretely, Douaa
 Hussain described these actions as a kind of »elitist advocacy«; so far, she says, it has
 failed in its language, discourse, and performance to reach to the grassroots level where
 the Islamist influence is widespread.
 In fact, one sees that the degree to which women's organizations have been able (or
 unable) to integrate their demands into constitution or change laws deemed discrimina
 tory have often been held hostage to the type of politics of survival the fractured political
 elites are engaged in. This pattern of politics is not new. It has been engrained in the
 gender policies of the post-colonial Arab states and continues to be conducted in the
 aftermath of the Arab uprisings. In their politics of survival, state leaders and core
 elites, faced with constant challenges to their legitimacy, often make alliances with po
 litical and social groups within a traditional base of power. They often exploit the Islamist
 card; that is, they deploy the support of some Islamist groups to legitimize their positions
 and policies in a religious sense and/or to delegitimize those of their rivals. This oppor
 tunistic behaviour has meant that if it made political sense to do so, the state would act
 in favour of women's emancipation. If it does not make sense to do so, it will not.37
 In the Egyptian case, the apparently positive changes, such as the current 10 % rep
 resentation of women on the Committee of Fifty, were often the result of a top-down
 approach. In this case, it was the Minister of Defence, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who pulled
 the strings and allowed it to happen. Yet he was not so much recognizing the importance
 of women's participation as making a tactical political gesture, aimed to highlight the
 difference between a new, presumably pro-women order and the earlier apparently re
 actionary and Islamist one.38
 In Libya, the fact that women were coordinating their advocacy did not lead to their
 stated objective, though it did succeed in guaranteeing them a margin of representation.
 In January 2012, the National Transitional Council adopted a new electoral law, which
 did not include a quota for the representation of women. An earlier draft had set a 10 %
 quota for women in the Constitutional Assembly »unless there are not enough female
 candidates«. As a result, NGOs and women's organizations, including the Voice of
 Libyan Women and the Libyan Rights Organization, organized demonstrations outside
 the office of the prime minister in Tripoli, calling this provision »scandalous« and de
 manding a higher quota. Instead of raising the quota, the council simply deleted the
 provision. The new law stipulates that 50 % of candidates on electoral lists must be
 women, but parties have no obligation to place women candidates at the top of their
 lists.39 Nevertheless, the zipper system that called for male-female parity on parties' lists
 Women made up 10 % of the membership; however, most were selected from among those
 sympathetic to the new regime.
 Elham Manea, The Arab State and Women's Rights, op. cit., pp. 107-112.
 Al-Sisi was a member of SCAF during the first transitional period and made comments to the
 effect blaming the women who endured the »virginity tests«.
 Ν. N., »Women and the Arab Spring: Taking their place?«, op. cit. (FN 7), pp. 27, 30.
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 of candidates brought a surprise in the parliamentary elections in July 2012: women won
 17 % of the seats in the new body.40
 In addition, women's organizations and NGOs have coordinated their advocacy work
 to ensure that women will be better represented in politics and that gender demands will
 become mainstream issues in the constitution. For example, in August and September of
 2012, a coalition of women's groups launched the Right Committee Campaign, which
 aims to lobby the GNC for a »diverse and independent constitutional drafting commit
 tee«. It also demanded that the committee writing the constitution has at least 30 % female
 members. Another coordinated effort was made in December of 2012: a number of lead
 ing women's NGOs met with the head of the GNC and gave him a signed petition calling
 for »affirmative action to ensure the inclusion of women in the Constituent Assem
 bly«.41 Along the same lines, women activists from across Libya met in January 2013 in
 Tripoli for a Voice of Libyan Women Conference. They repeated their demand that
 women make up 35 % of the Constituent Assembly and that the assembly hire a gender
 expert as an advisor. Also in January 2013, 29 women members of the congress formed
 a cross-party women's bloc in the GNC to promote women's rights and push for wom
 en's representation in the Constituent Assembly. The announcement came days after a
 member of Congress for the Region Zawiya criticized the presence of women in the
 congress. He said that the »attire of congresswomen and gender mixing within the GNC
 had caused god to be furious with the legislature, resulting in the congress' shortcom
 ings«.42
 Will these coordinated advocacy measures lead to concrete improvements in women's
 political representation? Again, it is too early to give a concrete answer. However, given
 the contentious political situation within Libya, regional and tribal divisions, and the rise
 in influence of the Islamist militia, it is safe to assume that women's demands may not
 be at the top of the priority list of the current ruling elites.
 At this point it should be mentioned that when women's organizations and activists
 did succeed in mobilizing the »streets« along with NGOs, the political elites often re
 sponded to demands for women's rights. This was evident in Tunisia after the outcry
 that followed the publication of Article 28 in the first draft of the constitution. Women's
 organizations coordinated their efforts to erase this article and were met by a counter
 effort by Islamist women's activists.
 Several tactics were used by women activists, members of organizations such as the
 Democratic Women's Association, La Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l'Homme (LT
 DH), and L'Association des Femmes Tunisiennes pour la Recherche sur le Developpe
 ment (AFTURD). These included demonstrations that brought thousands of supporters
 to the streets of Tunis as well as an online petition that garnered 30,000 signatures. The
 campaign used multi-media tools and repeatedly reminded Tunisians of the gains women
 40 D. Soguel, »Libyan elections give women a 17 % starting point« in: WeNews, July 18, 2012,
 http://womensenews.org/story/the-world/120719/libyan-elections-give-women-17-starting
 -point#.UJkPZm_A_4Y (accessed Nov. 1,2012).
 41 Ν. N., »A Revolution for All«, op. cit. (FN 11), p. 12.
 42 Ibid.
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 made during the post-colonial period which could be threatened by the terminology
 of »complementarity« roles of men and women.43 These actions were countered by
 women members of Islamist parties, who supported Article 28. Some expressed frustra
 tion with secular opponents whom they believed were taking the law out of context.
 Others defended the article on ideological grounds. For example, Farida Labidi, a mem
 ber of the Ennhada Executive Council, declared, »One cannot speak of equality between
 man and woman in the absolute«.44
 Such advocacy actions by women on both sides of the spectrum are indicators, as
 Charrad and Zarrugh argue, of the »ways in which women's organizations and activists
 asserted themselves in debates in Tunisia during the post-revolutionary period«. In fact,
 this kind of assertiveness departed significantly from the top-down promulgation of
 gender policy »that prevailed in earlier eras«.45 Most importantly, the grassroots actions
 by women's organizations were effective. Article 28 was omitted from the second and
 third drafts of the constitution of December 12, 2012, and April 30, 2013, respectively.
 The Ennahda party later made another concession by excluding specific references to
 Shari'a law as the official and primary source of legislation in the country.46
 Thus, Tunisian women's rights activists' success in mobilizing reflected several ele
 ments of the country's context: Tunisia's long tradition of secularism and women's
 emancipation, Ennahda's lack of hegemonic power in the political scene (40 % voted for
 it, but 60 % did not), and the ability of women's groups to mobilize the »streets«.
 The second type of actions defies traditional norms regarding harassment, sexuality,
 and sexual orientations. The backlash against gender justice and the mixed record of
 women's effectiveness in mobilizing should not be reason to think that the situation in
 the Arab world has returned to normal. In fact, as this paper argues, a return to normality
 is not synonymous with a return to the status quo regarding gender relations. This is not
 only evident in countries like Egypt or Tunisia, it can also be detected in the last place
 where one would expect it: Yemen. Things are not back to normal because of a slow yet
 tangible shift among young people in norms and attitudes towards the taboo subjects of
 sex, sexuality, harassment, and mixing between the sexes. Two examples are used to il
 lustrate this point:
 Example One. Sexual harassment has often been taboo in Egypt. It was often said that
 women experienced it but never talked about it - it was a disgrace, filling them with shame
 and guilt, and should be kept secret. Yet this is no longer the case in Egypt today.
 The sweeping victory of the Islamist parties in the parliamentary elections of Novem
 ber 28, 2011, and January 11, 2012, marked the beginning of a new trend in harassment.
 Unveiled women were assaulted in poor neighbourhoods, on public transportation, and
 on the street. Vigilantes formed groups to enforce Islamic laws, and Islamist political
 Mounira Μ. Charrad / Amina Zarrugh, »The Arab Spring and Women's Rights in Tunisia« in:
 E. International Relations, September 4, 2013, http://www.e-ir.info/2013/09/04/the-arab-spr
 ing-and-womens-rights-in-tunisia/ (accessed Oct. 8. 2013).
 Quoted in ibid.
 Ibid.
 Ibid.
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 leaders and members of parliament praised them and advocated enforcing the wearing of
 the hijab (headscarf). This was the context in which young teenagers (aged 12 to 15),
 working in an organized and collective way, attacked both veiled and unveiled girls in
 parks and in public; the attacks were reported in areas all over Egypt during the two Eid
 public holidays in 2012. The women-only car on the Cairo Underground was regularly
 invaded by attacking men. Physical and sexual assaults targeted women in the streets of
 poor urban and rural areas, as well as women protestors in Tahrir Square, scene of several
 gang rapes. These attacks followed a pattern. A group of men would surround the victim,
 form a ring around her, and push her to an isolated area before her defenders would have
 time to stop them.47
 Many women activists saw these attacks as an orchestrated attempt to intimidate
 women and stop them from participating in political actions. The feeble reactions from
 the authorities, which either denied the incidents occurred or blamed the victims for
 their »un-Islamic behaviour«, drew national outrage. Yet the most important change was
 in the way women reacted. They did no longer keep the harassment secret. In fact, many
 of the women activists who were sexually attacked came forward to describe their ex
 periences openly on Facebook and then on television.48 Such testimonies were unheard
 of and defied the common code of conduct in such situations. They also caused great
 controversy within Egypt. Between those supporting the victims and those blaming
 them, another generational conflict was visible. Women told this author privately
 that »older« women insisted that girls who were »proper« would never reveal such in
 cidents, or they insisted that such harassment never occurred - statements that caused
 their daughters to burst out in anger 49 Meanwhile, activists insisted that these tactics to
 silence them would not succeed. One famous activist, Jasmine Elbermawy, who experi
 enced a gang attack on November 23, 2012, called publicly on Egyptian women »not to
 fear«. She called on them to »continue to demand your rights, go down [to the streets]
 and do not look at these ugly attempts that seek to intimidate us. The smallest right we
 have is to maintain our humanity«.50
 Example Two. In Yemen, specifically in its Northern part, the youth uprising of
 February and March 2011 had unexpected effects that resulted in new trends in social
 behaviour. Not only did women start to participate in demonstrations, defying the strict
 segregation of sexes common in North Yemen. Two other developments also took place.
 Again, neither symbolizes a social revolution. Yet they do indicate a slow social change
 taking place among a certain segment of educated and urban youth.
 Iman Bibars, »The Middle East: Fighting for Women's Rights«, op. cit. (FN 25).
 See, for example, Akher Annahar Program, »Jasmin Elbermaoui recounts her harass
 ment« in: AnNahar TV Channel, November 1, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W
 vBPvIjg8xI; Akher Annahar Program, »Hania Moheib recounts her harassment« in: AnNahar
 TV Channel, November 1,2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=25XlollfsXc.
 Author's visit, Cairo, April 2013.
 Salah Aldin Muntasar, »Don't be afraid - Jasmine Elbermawy: A Message to Egyptian Girls
 (women)« in: Ahram Digital (in Arabic), July 5, 2013, http://digital.ahram.org.eg/articles.asp
 x?Serial=1344475&eid=15367 (accessed Oct. 8, 2013).
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 The first relates to what Hind Aleryani, a young Yemeni journalist and activist, de
 scribed as »the phenomenon of mixed cafes in Yemen«.51 She said that while the political
 situation remained as before, she observed a new phenomenon in the cafes of Sanaa,
 calling it a »social change«, evident in young men and women sitting together!52
 »This [mixing and sitting together in a public place] of course never happened in the
 past, and when I say in the past I mean in the last few years, no less than four years
 ago. At that time, mixing between young men and women was very strongly de
 nounced. In fact, when I was at Sanaa University, if a young woman talked to a male
 fellow student, she risked ruining her reputation. This perception and fear was so
 engrained that the brother of a friend of mine used to be afraid to talk to her at the
 university lest others think he was a stranger. So to let her know he was ready to leave
 and take her home, he would shake the car keys in his hand as a sign. Of course this
 method was humiliating, but no one denounced it. This has changed somehow now.
 How? It happened thanks to the sit-in squares that formed during the days of the
 revolution. It seems that these squares broke the barrier of fear, [a fear] which made
 young men and women dread each other as if they were from another planet«.53
 This brings to point the second change in Yemen. This author hesitates to call it a de
 velopment because it concerns a single incident in Sanaa, but by all accounts, it is a his
 torical incident, simply because it never happened before. A young male activist came
 out as a gay man, and he announced it on his blog while he was in Yemen!
 Alaa Jabran was a key figure in the Yemen youth movement; he organized and led
 protests throughout the 2011 uprising. He then decided it was time to announce his sexual
 orientation and said this on his blog:54
 »Equality and rights must be claimed; no one will give us what we deserve. Fear is the
 most powerful motivation in this formula and hell yeah, I'm afraid. We, queers, are
 under siege, are being attacked on all fronts and I'm afraid that it's okay with us. Being
 visible is the first step! And if we remain invisible, they [heterosexuals] will continue
 living, not acknowledging our existence nor your invisibility, and we'll just end up
 contributing to a culture that only tries to kill us. Every day one of us is taken, we're
 taken by homophobic governments, religions and worst of all, we're taken by our own
 silence and denial«.
 Hind Aleryani, »The Phenomenon of Mixed Cafes in Yemen« in: France 24 (in Arabic), July
 2, 2013, http://f24.my/177Vypk (accessed September 9, 2013).
 Ibid.
 Ibid.
 Alaa Jabran, »On Identity, Sexuality, Gender and other Stuff« in: Alaa Blog, May 29, 2013,
 http://ajyemen.wordpress.com/2013/05/29/on-identity-sexuality-gender-and-other-stuff/
 (accessed Sept. 9, 2013).
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 Asked why he chose to do that in a country that punishes male homosexuality with the
 death penalty, he answered: »I took part in the revolution to change our reality; it is not
 a revolution if we don't revolutionise every aspect of our community and ourselves«.55
 Judging from the death threats he received, the denouncements that poured in on his
 blog, and his later flight to Canada, the social revolution he was hoping for has not yet
 arrived. Nevertheless, the fact remains that others - Yemeni homosexuals, male and fe
 male - wrote on his blog, and they expressed similar positions. They want to be visible!
 A decade ago, this incident, with its echo and the support it got from a small number of
 Yemenis, could have been an incident in a novel, never imagined in reality.
 3. Conclusion
 The way that women experienced the Arab Spring, by participating and then being ex
 cluded, may not have been surprising after all. It reinforced a historical pattern well es
 tablished within the Arab ΜΕΝΑ region. Women would take part in historical events
 taking shape within their own countries; they would demonstrate, mobilize, and assume
 new roles that defied the traditional views of woman's role in society. The moment the
 situation started to calm down, society sent women the message that they should go back
 home.
 While this pattern seems to have been the norm in various revolutions, wars of inde
 pendence, and intifadas in Arab countries, elsewhere, however, the general trend was an
 emergence of a new gender consciousness that sought to redefine women's roles in so
 ciety as well as their space and independence. The reason this kind of development was
 historically hindered in the Arab ΜΕΝΑ region is related, in my opinion, to the emer
 gence of the authoritarian Arab state, with its politics of survival and most importantly
 its intolerance of any independent civil society action, including independent women's
 movements. The stagnation that dominated the political spectrum, which was reflected
 in all aspects of life within the region, was so suffocating that something had to give -
 hence the uprisings that started when Bu Azizi set himself on fire in Tunisia on December
 17, 2010. But what has since been termed the Arab Spring was really just a winter for
 Arab women. The same pattern repeated itself. Women participated, in ways tailored to
 their local contexts, only to be faced with a backlash. The backlash was not only caused
 by a conservative society. It was compounded by the actions of political elites, indifferent
 to women's rights and eager to survive politically, and of ideologically determined Is
 lamist movements that made a mission of implementing their world view of the woman's
 role in society.
 Instead of succumbing to the pressure and going back to their homes, women reacted
 differently this time. Women's groups and activists as well as human rights organizations
 started to articulate positions that specifically address issues of gender justice and human
 rights for women. This was a departure from their initial participation in the uprisings
 55 Ν. Ν., »Alaa Jabran: One of Yemen's first openly gay men« in: BBC News Online, June 19,
 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22893341 (accessed Sept. 9, 2013).
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 where the focus was national aspirations for political change and democracy. This de
 parture was necessary: as these activists and groups realized, more democracy did not
 necessarily mean more rights for women. In a democracy where those coming to power
 seem intent on rewriting the meaning of universal women's human rights, speaking of
 biologically determined and complementary different roles and hence rights, democracy
 seems to elevate these views to legally sanctioned gender discrimination. Moreover, in a
 transitional and very uncertain period where the political elites are still juggling to survive
 politically, women's rights have been the least of their concerns, let alone a priority.
 This time was also different because women's and human rights organizations started
 to coordinate their actions and join forces to advocate for more rights and participation
 for women. The effectiveness of these actions has been mixed, often dependent on the
 political context and the elites' politics of survival. Only when these organizations were
 in a position to mobilize the »streets« in addition to NGOs, these actions did have a real
 effect. The ability to reach the masses seems to be the decisive element that can make a
 difference in such a context.
 This time is different for another reason too. For the first time one can discern indi
 cations of social change: once-taboo issues relating to sexuality, sexual harassment, gen
 der mixing, and homosexuality are not only being discussed, they are even being defiantly
 challenged. And just as young people were the power engine of the Arab uprisings, they
 were also the driving force behind these challenges. In such a context, one can more and
 more often detect a generational gap that provides speaking room for a younger gener
 ation that does not seem to subscribe to the rules dictated by society. Whether these
 indications will lead to full social change is still up in the air. What is clear is that these
 uprisings, despite their chilling effects on women's lives, have unsettled certain percep
 tions about gender and women's rights.
 Summary
 Throughout Arab history, women have played an integral role in many independence
 movements and at times of wars, and in the process defied social stereotypes and tradi
 tional constrains. However, the moment the situation started to normalize, the old social
 norms and traditional perceptions of women's roles have tended to reassert themselves.
 The same can be said about women's visible participation in the Arab popular uprisings
 of 2011: participation was followed by a conservative backlash. This paper will narrate
 the pattern of women's political participation that was then followed by exclusion, of
 fering concrete examples. It will highlight the argument that this backlash may not be
 surprising after all. Nevertheless, despite the backlash, the flux now taking place in the
 region is unsettling gender perceptions and roles. Whether these changes are sustainable
 remains a matter of speculation.
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 Zusammenfassung
 In der arabischen Geschichte haben Frauen immer wieder in Unabhängigkeitsbewegun
 gen und zu Kriegszeiten eine wichtige Rolle gespielt und sich dabei über traditionelle
 Rollenmuster hinweggesetzt. Kaum jedoch hatte sich die Situation normalisiert, mani
 festierten sich die sozialen Normen und die Wahrnehmung der Frauenrolle in ihrer ur
 sprünglichen Form. Dies gilt auch für die Teilnahme der Frauen in den arabischen Volks
 aufständen von 2011: Auf die Teilhabe folgte die konservative Reaktion. Der Artikel
 behandelt anhand konkreter Beispiele die zu beobachtenden Muster der politischen Par
 tizipation von Frauen, auf die dann Ausgrenzung folgte. Er argumentiert, dass der Back
 lash nicht überrascht. Gleichzeitig aber bricht der Wandel die hergebrachte Gender
 Wahrnehmung und die entsprechenden Rollenmuster auf.
 Elb am Manea, Die arabischen Volksauistände aus einer Gender-Perspektive
 Entstehung und Geschichte der WASG
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